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Abstract: Within 5 years, China’s CO2 emissions have nearly doubled, and China 
may already be the world’s largest emitter of CO2. Evidence suggests that exports 
could be a main cause for the rise in Chinese CO2 emissions; however, no systematic 
study has analyzed this issue, especially over time. We find that in 2005, around one 
third of Chinese emissions (1700 Mt CO2) were due to production of exports, and 
this proportion has risen from 12% (230 Mt) in 1987 and only 21% (760 Mt) as 
recently as 2002. It is likely that consumption in the developed world is driving this 
trend. A majority of these emissions have largely escaped the scrutiny of arguments 
over “carbon leakage” due to the current, narrow definition of leakage. Climate 
policies which would make the developed world responsible for China’s export 
emissions have both benefits and costs, and must be carefully designed to achieve 
political consensus and equity. Whoever is responsible for these emissions, China’s 
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rapidly expanding infrastructure and inefficient coal-powered electricity system 
need urgent attention.  
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1 Introduction 
Within a very short period of time, from 2002 to 2007, China’s CO2 emissions have 
almost doubled and it is now believed that China is the world’s biggest emitter of CO2 
(Gregg et al., 2008). China faces increasing international pressure to curb its CO2 
emissions, but argues that “[t]he ramifications of limiting the development of developing 
countries would be even more serious than those from climate change.” (Wu, 2007). 
China has several arguments for why it should not be required to limit its CO2 emissions 
in the short term (National Development and Reform Commission, 2007). First, limits on 
China’s CO2 emissions would hamper economic development. Second, China has low 
per capita emissions, ranked 73rd in 2004, though this ranking is both higher than some 
developed countries and growing quickly (WRI, 2007). Third, historically China argues 
that it only contributes a small amount to cumulative emissions, which is true on a per-
capita basis – ranking 92nd since 1900 – but not for absolute emissions – ranking fourth 
since 1990 (WRI, 2007). Finally, despite capital investments and household consumption 
dominating China’s increasing CO2 emissions (Peters et al., 2007), China has currently 
focused arguments towards the role of exports, claiming it should not be responsible for 
emissions attributable to the production of exports(McGregor, 2007). In 2005 exports 
accounted for a relatively large amount: 33% of China’s GDP, increasing from 12% in 
1987.  
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 Despite several references to this issue (Ahmad and Wyckoff, 2003; IEA, 2007 p.290-
291; Peters and Hertwich, 2008a; Peters et al., 2007; Wang and Watson, 2007), there 
have been no systematic studies on the contribution of exports to China’s CO2 emissions, 
and particularly how this has changed over time. Several studies have estimated the 
emissions embodied in China’s exports (and imports), but few studies have focused on 
this as the primary issue. Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003) using a related method to ours, 
found that in 1997, 15% of China’s emissions were embodied in exports and 3% of 
China’s domestic emissions were imported. Peters et al. (2007) found that in 1997 25% 
of China’s emissions were exported and 24% avoided by imports and in 2002 32% and 
34%. However, Peters et al. (2007) did not adjust for imports in the production of 
exports, and thus their method differs slightly from what is used here. Wang and Watson 
(2007) estimated the emissions embodied in China’s exports in 2004 as 23%, though they 
used a relatively simple method which fails to capture supply-chain effects. The most 
comprehensive study to date, Peters and Hertwich (2008a) considered the emissions 
embodied in trade for 87 countries and regions and found that in 2001 China exported 
24% of its CO2 emissions and imported 7% of China’s domestic emissions. This study is 
the most similar methodologically to the analysis presented here and will be used to 
supplement the results. 
 
We apply environmental input-output analysis (Leontief and Ford, 1972) to estimate the 
CO2 emissions emitted in the production of exports in China from 1987 to 2005, 
representing the most recent data available. This method considers all the upstream 
 3
supply-chain inputs necessary for the production of exports. The following section 
describes methods and data sources, followed by the results and a discussion of their 
relevance.   
 
2 Methods and Data 
2.1 Environmental Input-Output Analysis (EIOA) 
The calculations are based on environmental input-output analysis (EIOA), (Miller and 
Blair, 1985; United Nations, 1999). This is a well-established method and is the basis of 
the System of National Accounts (Leontief, 1986). A summary of the method is shown 
here, but more detailed treatments are available elsewhere (Miller and Blair, 1985, United 
Nations, 1999).  
 
As originally formalized by Leontief in his groundbreaking work (Leontief, 1986), the 
total output of an economy, x, can be expressed as the sum of intermediate consumption, 
Ax, and final consumption, y:  
  x = Ax + y                              (1) 
where A is the economy’s direct requirements matrix and y is the demand for which the 
supply chain output, x, is to be derived. The matrix A describes the relationship between 
all sectors of the economy. In this study we used four separate final demand categories 
from each year’s input-output table: household consumption, fixed capital investment, 
exports, and governmental consumption. When solved for total output, this equation 
yields: 
  x = (I − A)−1 y                              (2) 
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When coupled with an environmental matrix, F, which shows the environmental 
emissions caused by each sector in the model, normalized by the sector’s economic 
output, x = (x1 x2 … xn)T , (where n is the number of sectors in the input-output table) the 
total amount of emissions can be calculated as: 
f = F(I − A)−1 y                             (3) 
with f representing the sector-wise total supply chain emissions to meet the final demand 
y.  
 
This is the standard method for environmental IOA. However, this method is not 
sufficient for studies of trade as the direct requirements matrix A usually does not 
distinguish between domestically produced and imported products (United Nations, 
1993). Thus, it is common to derive new requirements matrices and final demand vectors 
in which only domestic goods are included, Ad and yd:   
( )
( )
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*
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                          (4) 
where si is the share of imports in the supply of products and services to each sector, i. 
This method removes imported goods, m, from the direct requirements table and from 
components of GDP other than exports, e, (household consumption, capital investment, 
and government consumption). This method assumes that each economic sector and final 
demand category uses imports in the same proportions; for example, it assumes that 
industry, government, and households each consume the same share of domestically 
produced and imported software. 
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 For each year, then, the emissions embodied in exports (or other GDP components) are 
calculated as:  
   1( )e e
−= −f F I A y                          (5) 
where fe is total domestic emissions embodied in total exports ye.  
 
There are different methods to treat the emissions embodied in trade depending on how 
intermediate imports are dealt with (Peters, 2008). In this paper we consider total exports 
(and imports) from China, thus the exports include both intermediate and final demand. If 
a global model is used, it is possible to consider trade in exports to final demand only. 
Both approaches are correct, but they do answer different questions. For Chinese policy 
at the national level, it is most relevant to analyze the total emissions in China regardless 
if they are exports for final consumers or as inputs into foreign industries. If one wants to 
analyze the global emissions to produce different products – such as in life-cycle 
assessment – then trade in intermediate products must be allocated differently.  
 
In addition to this standard method, IOA usually requires some degree of country-specific 
manipulations depending on data availability.  
 
2.3 Normalization 
We follow standard procedures for normalization of the monetary IO table and the energy 
and emissions data, 
A = Z xˆ total-1                               (6) 
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where A is the inter-industry requirements matrix which represents the technology of the 
Chinese economy and ^ represents diagonalization. Because the energy data is more 
aggregated than the IOTs, it is necessary to map between the IO sectors and the energy 
sectors for each year. To normalize the total energy and emissions data, T, we first 
aggregate the output to the sector classification used in the energy and emissions data and 
then normalize before disaggregating back to the IOT aggregation, 
 ( )-1totalF = T Px P                       (7) 
where P represents the mapping between IO sectors and energy sector, constructed from 
the sector descriptions of the IOT and energy data. This procedure assumes that all IO 
sectors that map to the one energy sector have the same emission intensity. Since the IOT 
and energy intensities now have the same industry classification, we can perform the 
calculation for each year, as shown above in equation 5. 
 
2.4 Approximation of Regional Responsibility 
Since IOTs do not include information about the country of destination for exports, 
additional data were needed. This analysis was based on a previous study by one of the 
authors (GP) using the GTAP database (Peters and Hertwich, 2008a). Their methodology 
is similar as described in this paper, except that Peters and Hertwich (2008a) cover 87 
countries and regions at a 57 sector resolution for a single year, 2001. The calculation 
done here is extended by including the bilateral time series from 1987-2002 from the 
GTAP database. The time series has some discontinuities in the early 1990’s resulting 
from the break-up of the Former Soviet Union and different sector classifications in 
GTAP over time. Since the trade data is in current prices we consider trade shares, which 
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assumes similar inflationary effects and efficiency improvements between countries and 
sectors over time. While this assumption does not hold in reality (IEA, 2007), it is 
satisfactory for the approximation of responsibility over the time investigated in this 
paper. The GTAP trade data only extended to 2002.  
 
For 2005 the destination of the emissions embodied in China’s exports was approximated 
based on Chinese export data (total exports by country of destination) from the China 
Statistical Yearbook 2007 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2007b). Data for the years 2000, 
2001, and 2002 were averaged to obtain approximate carbon intensities of total exports to 
each region; i.e., CO2/yuan, which were then used for linear interpolation of embodied 
carbon in exports for 2003-2005 using total exports (data for 2000-2002 were rather 
similar in all regions, justifying the assumption that these carbon intensities would hold 
through to 2005, Table 1). For example, from 2000-2002, exports to the US were seen as 
relatively more carbon intensive than exports to the rest of the world. These relative 
factors from Table 1 were then used in combination with total exports to each region, 
Table 2, to approximate embodied CO2 exported to each region in 2003-2005. 
 
Table 1 
 
Table 2 
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2.5 Data Sources 
2.5.1 Input-Output Tables  
We employed China’s input-output tables (IOT) from Li and Xue (1998) for 1987, 1990 
and 1995 with 30 sectors in constant 1990 prices. We obtained the input-output tables 
from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) for 1992 with 118 sectors 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 1996), 1997 with 124 sectors (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 1999), 2002 with 122 sectors (National Bureau of Statistics, 2006), and 2005 
with 42 sectors (National Bureau of Statistics, 2007a), all at current prices. All the tables 
have the same final demand categories: household consumption, government 
expenditures, capitals investments, exports, imports, and “others”. “Others” represents a 
balance specific to the Chinese IOT and was removed from the IOT (Peters et al., 2007, 
Supporting Information). 
2.5.2 Energy and Emissions data 
The CO2 by industry sector for 1992, 1997, and 2002 were constructed in previous work 
by two of the authors (GP and CW) , and data for all other years were calculated using 
the same method (see Peters et al., 2006 for details). The emissions include both the 
combustion of fuels and industrial processes and were constructed using official Chinese 
energy statistics and the IPCC reference approach (IPCC, 1996). The energy and 
emissions data have 36 industry sectors.  
 
3 Results 
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Fig. 1 shows a breakdown of China’s CO2 emissions from 1987 to 2005 into the four 
driving forces of GDP: household consumption, capital investment, government 
expenditure, and exports. Since imports have already been subtracted from production 
functions (equation 4), the sum of these four components equals total domestic CO2 
emissions, as opposed to total CO2 emissions embodied in consumption.  
 
Fig 1 
 
We find that in 2005, 33% (1,700 Mt) of China’s domestic CO2 emissions were in the 
production of exports and this has steadily increased from 12% (230 Mt) in 1987. 
Interestingly, these figures mirror very closely the rise of exports as a percentage of GDP, 
meaning that exports are on average no more or less carbon-intensive than domestic 
consumption and investment. To put this figure into perspective, China’s export 
emissions in 2005 (1,700 Mt) were similar to the combined emissions of Germany, 
France, and the UK (1850 Mt) (EIA, 2007).  
 
A rise in exported CO2, from only 21% (759 Mt) of domestic emissions, has occurred 
since 2002, mirroring both the overall steep increase in China’s CO2 emissions (keeping 
in mind potential undercounting in 2002) and the large increase in exports over this 
period, from 22% of GDP in 2002 to 33% in 2005. In most years the growth rate of the 
emissions from the production of exports is greater than the growth rate of total 
emissions, showing the particular importance of exports to China’s growth in CO2 
emissions.  
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 It is useful to breakdown the Chinese export emissions by commodity. Figure 2 shows a 
breakdown of the growth in these emissions by major commodity groups that China 
exports. Recently (in 2005), substantial fractions of total emissions were due to exports of 
electronics (22% of total), metal products (13%), textiles (11%), and chemical products 
(10%). It is clear that the large recent growth in export emissions is increasingly due to 
advanced products, much more so than previously, as the 1995 breakdown of export 
emissions was substantially different: 19% textiles, 13% electronics, 12% machinery, and 
10% chemicals, and 7% metal products. Emissions embodied in primary product exports 
(including here: all mining, raw timber, raw chemicals, and basic metals) have decreased 
from around 20-24% in the early years of the analysis (1987-1992) to only 13% in 2002-
2005 as the Chinese economy has developed into producing higher value-added items.  
 
China also is a large importer and avoids domestic emissions by importing raw materials 
as well as final goods and services. The method utilized here (single-region EIOA) can be 
used to estimate the CO2 emissions which would have occurred in China had all Chinese 
imports been made domestically (typically called “emissions avoided by imports”, EAI). 
Table 4 shows this quantity, in million tonnes of CO2 (Tg CO2), as well as total Chinese 
emissions (total) and emissions embodied in exports (EEE) for comparison. 
 
Clearly, China avoids large amounts of emissions through its imports; in every year the 
avoided emissions are higher than the exported emissions. However, EAI is a biased 
measure for China, since China’s carbon intensity is significantly higher than most 
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(Peters and Hertwich, 2008a; Peters et al., 2007). A better estimate of emissions 
embodied in imports can be calculated using a global model (usually limited to a single 
year), but this is beyond the scope of this paper. Peters and Hertwich estimated the 
emissions embodied in Chinese trade using a global model and found that 216 Mt of CO2 
was embodied in Chinese imports in 2001. This compares to 1170 Mt avoided by imports 
in 2002 estimated in this paper. 
 
Table 3 
 
The current focus on China mirrors the importance of trade in the environmental profile 
of many other countries. For example, in 2001, 22% of global CO2 emissions were in the 
production of exports (Peters and Hertwich, 2008a). Countries vary widely in their 
relative shares of CO2 in trade; most European countries have a high share of their 
domestic emissions in the production of exports (20-50%), the USA had 8%, Japan 15%, 
India 13%, South Korea 28%, and South Africa 45% (Peters and Hertwich, 2008a). A 
key explanatory variable for the share of emissions in the production of exports is size – 
in general, small countries have larger shares while large, and thus relatively self-
sufficient, countries have lower shares. China does not fall into this categorization as it is 
a large country with a large share of exports. China’s exports thus play a more important 
role in its environmental profile compared to other countries.  
 
A key question is whether the rapid growth of exports in China – or any other country – 
is at the expense of production in developed countries, loosely termed by many as 
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“carbon leakage” (Metz et al., 2007) or the “pollution haven hypothesis (PHH)” 
(Rothman, 1998).  The IPCC has placed low importance on carbon leakage since its 
definition of leakage only considers marginal emission changes in non-Annex I countries 
resulting explicitly from climate policy within Annex I countries (Peters and Hertwich, 
2008b). It is unlikely that China’s increased export emissions are due to current climate 
policy in Annex I countries; they are simply a byproduct of China’s other advantages for 
production such as lower environmental standards and lower labor costs. Using the IPCC 
definition one would expect to find low levels of carbon leakage, and thus, the problem 
has been defined away. But the issue does remain: increased consumption in Annex I 
countries is met by expanded production in non-Annex I countries (Peters and Hertwich, 
2008a; Rothman, 1998; Weber and Matthews, 2007). A stronger definition of carbon 
leakage considers increases in emissions in non-Annex I countries that might occur for 
reasons other than climate policy in Annex I countries. It is this latter type of “carbon 
leakage” that lies at the core of China’s increased export emissions.  
 
Indeed, large portions of recent Chinese export emissions go to the developed world, with 
approximately 27% to the US, 19% to the EU-27, and 14% to the remaining Annex B 
countries, mainly Japan, Australia, and New Zealand (Figure 3). While approximately 
40% of China’s export emissions go to the non-Annex B developing world, these flows 
are still important because Chinese exports to developing countries may displace either 
domestic production there or production from another trading partner which would have 
released less CO2 for the same amount of products.  
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Fig. 3 
 
This is because relative to production in most other countries, Chinese production is more 
polluting, due both to inefficient production systems and a coal-dominated electricity 
supply (Peters and Hertwich, 2008a; Peters et al., 2007; Weber and Matthews, 2007). The 
low-cost of Chinese production does benefit most consumers, but this benefit comes at 
the detriment of both the local Chinese environment (Streets et al., 2006) and the global 
environment due to the effects of climate change. Cheap production in China could be 
globally beneficial in terms of the environment as well, though, particularly in driving 
down the costs of environmental products like energy-efficient lighting or wind turbines. 
Any increased emissions from production of these products in China would likely be 
outweighed by the positive impacts of their use (see for example (Lenzen and 
Munksgaard, 2002)). Unfortunately, this potential benefit of cheap Chinese production 
has not yet materialized.  
 
Recently, China reacted to both the increasing pollution caused by the production of 
exports and fears of resource security by raising export taxes on certain products 
(Ministry of Finance People's Republic of China, 2007). These export taxes were placed 
mostly on primary products such as raw metals and chemicals.  However, as previously 
shown above, these products represent a small fraction of the emissions from China’s 
exports—approximately 13% in 2005, even if all chemicals are included in this category 
(see fig. 2).  
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A more effective approach would use monetary or tax policy to discourage large-volume 
export commodities such as electronics (22% of exported CO2 in 2005), machinery 
(19%), metal products (13%), and textiles (11%). However, since these higher value-
added products contribute more to China’s economic growth than primary products, this 
approach would lead to both higher costs to the Chinese economy through loss in 
competitiveness, as well as costs to consuming countries through increasing inflation. 
Thus, it is unlikely in the short term. However, over the longer term it is in the interest of 
both Western countries and China to lower the energy and carbon intensity of its 
production practices, as the advantages of producing in China are immense. Perhaps, 
then, cooperation on low-carbon research and development is the best avenue forward 
from both sides.  
 
4 Uncertainties 
 
While the results clearly show the importance and scale of the issue of Chinese exports 
and climate change, it is important to stress the many uncertainties in calculating and 
allocating such emissions (Weber and Matthews, 2007). Input-output analysis itself has 
many inherent uncertainties related to the calculation and balancing of the actual tables 
(which are outside the hands of IO practitioners), aggregation of unlike products into 
economic sectors, the assumption of proportionality and linearity, and many others (see 
Lenzen, 2001 for a detailed discussion). The “imports assumption” is particularly 
important here, as single region IOA is not able to correctly calculate the emissions 
embodied in China’s imports, only emissions avoided by importing.  
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The method’s inherent limitations are compounded with large data uncertainties in both 
economic and particularly energy data. For example, several authors have questioned the 
legitimacy of the official Chinese energy statistics for certain years, especially from 
around 1996 to 2004 (Sinton, 2001; Streets et al., 2001; Wu, 2007). During this period, 
Chinese coal consumption first declined and then rose precipitously, creating substantial 
variation in the energy intensity of the economy. There is still significant controversy 
over whether the 1996-2000 decline in energy intensity was real or a factor of under-
reporting to data collection agencies (Peters et al., 2007), though recent satellite data 
seems to suggest some level of under-reporting (Akimoto et al., 2006). We utilize the raw 
data from the Chinese statistical agencies despite these issues (though we use data revised 
for the third time after release, such as using data released in 2005 for year 2002), though 
we note that this may cause an underestimation of China’s export emissions in 2000 and 
2002.  
 
Thus, in the face of such large uncertainties in both method and data, the calculated 
emissions embodied in exports must be regarded as approximate. However, the scale and 
trend of the numbers are unlikely to be affected extremely in any one direction by these 
uncertainties, with the exception of the potential underestimation of coal consumption in 
2000 and 2002.  
 
5 Discussion: Who is responsible for China’s emissions? 
It is clear Chinese exports are currently responsible for large amounts of greenhouse gas 
emissions; our estimate for 2005 (1700 Mt CO2) represents 6% of global CO2 emissions 
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from fossil fuels (EIA, 2007). This staggering statistic begs the question of who should be 
responsible for the emissions resulting from the production of China’s exports 
(Munksgaard and Pedersen, 2001). There are, of course, many arguments from both sides 
of the issue. 
 
On the one hand, while China’s economic development benefits from export growth, so 
do the consumers in developed countries, and it can be argued that they should be held at 
least somewhat responsible for emissions occurring because of their demand for low-
priced goods. If these consumers were to become partially responsible for China’s export 
emissions (Peters, 2008), perhaps China would be more willing to play an active role in 
post-Kyoto climate commitments. In general, recognizing the role the international trade 
plays in greenhouse gas emissions may open new opportunities, and is possibly a 
precondition for political agreement (Peters and Hertwich, 2008a).  
 
However, if others become responsible for China’s export emissions, then who is 
responsible for China’s imported carbon emissions? China itself imports many products, 
including many components of the final products it exports, and it avoids greenhouse gas 
emissions by doing so. As shown above, in all years analyzed, no matter how they are 
counted the total emissions embodied in China’s imports are substantial, and if China 
does not want to be held responsible for its exported emissions, it must be held at least 
responsible for what it imports.  
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Although one-third of China’s CO2 emissions result from the production of exports, it is 
important to keep track of the remaining two-thirds of emissions. Capital expenditure 
necessary for building up infrastructure and production capacities has been responsible 
for between 32-37% of China’s CO2 emissions since 1987 (see above Fig. 1). Of course, 
at least part of these emissions could be indirectly attributed to exports because much of 
the infrastructure improvements occurring are for export production. However, data were 
not available to allocate China’s capital expenditures by different sectors to domestic or 
export markets.  
 
The importance of exports and capital goods can also be shown by the fact that household 
consumption is responsible for a decreasing portion of emissions, from 45% in 1987 
down to 28% in 2005. This drop in household consumption’s share in total emissions 
mirrors the overall drop in private consumption share in China, possibly due to high 
savings rates caused by peculiarities of the labour and market and social system 
(Modigliani and Cao, 2004) and especially due to low household incomes caused by an 
underdeveloped financial sector (Aziz and Cui, 2007). Nevertheless, household 
consumption is widely seen as the future driver of China’s economy, and thus its future 
CO2 emissions (Aziz and Cui, 2007; IEA, 2007).   
 
Whoever is responsible for emissions to produce Chinese exports, inefficient and coal-
dominated electricity production is at the core of China’s CO2 emissions, accounting for 
44% of China’s total emissions in 2005. It is clear that urgent improvements are needed 
in this sector. Increasing efficiencies, installing more renewable power, and overcoming 
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the financial and technological hurdles involved with new technologies such as carbon 
capture and sequestration (CCS) should be the first priority of China and its export 
partners alike. Allowing Kyoto parties to count the incremental cost of CCS within the 
framework of the Clean Development Mechanism could be a crucial first step (de 
Coninck, 2008), as this would allow some of the importers of China’s carbon-intensive 
goods to invest in lowering the carbon intensity of Chinese exports.  
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Table 1: Relative carbon intensity of exports to each region, 2000-2002, as % of embodied 
emissions/% value of trade. Annex B refers to the Annex B countries of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
 CO2/yuan 
United States 1.28
European Union (EU-27) 1.02
Economies in Transition 0.86
Rest of Annex B 0.90
Non-Annex B Countries 0.91
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Table 2: Total export share to each region from 2003-2005 (see Figure 3 for country definitions). 
 2003 2004 2005
US 0.21 0.21 0.21
EU27 0.18 0.18 0.19
EIT 0.02 0.02 0.02
Rest of B 0.17 0.16 0.15
Non-B 0.42 0.43 0.43
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Fig. 1: China’s total domestic CO2 emissions, divided by driving demand: exports, 
governmental consumption, household consumption, and capital investment. 
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Figure 2: Chinese export emissions by major commodity group (Tg CO2). 
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Table 3: Total CO2 emissions, emissions embodied in exports (EEE), and emissions 
avoided by imports (EAI). All values in Tg CO2. The emissions avoided by imports 
are different to the actual emissions embodied in imports (see text). *The actual 
emission embodied in imports for 2001 was estimated to be 216 Mt CO2 (see text). 
 1987 1990 1992 1995 1997 2002 2005 
Total 2010 2230 2410 3010 3210 3620 5030 
EEE 230 360 420 570 580 760 1670 
EAI 390 420 560 710 700 1170* 2200 
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Figure 3: Region of destination for Chinese CO2 emissions embodied in exports 
by year. EU27 does not include any economies in transition (EIT), and "Rest of 
B" represents all remaining Annex B countries which do not fall into another 
group. The dips and peaks represent changes in trade shares, even though growth 
continued. Annual variations can represent both realistic changes and also errors 
in the trade data. The dip in the early 1990’s relates to political boundary 
changes and a merging of different datasets. 
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